Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability in N-able N-central allows Authentication Bypass.<br /> <br /> This issue affects N-central: through 2026.1.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim&amp;#39;s session with a forged token.<br /> <br /> Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module&amp;#39;s revoke callback and the implementation&amp;#39;s on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature.<br /> <br /> An attacker who knows or guesses a victim&amp;#39;s identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim&amp;#39;s legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion.<br /> <br /> This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:encode_permissions!/1, &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:do_encode_permissions!/2.<br /> <br /> The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permissions/1 is not affected because it skips keys absent from the configured permission set.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-controlled binary input.<br /> <br /> Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding encodes permission scopes by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. When encode/3 in lib/guardian/permissions/atom_encoding.ex is called with a list, each binary entry is handled by the encode_value/3 binary clause, which calls String.to_atom(value) with no allow-list check. The perm_set argument (the application&amp;#39;s small, finite set of legitimate permission names) is discarded, so any external string flows straight into atom creation. This encoder is selected with use Guardian.Permissions, encoding: Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding and reached through the imported encode/3 entry point.<br /> <br /> String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that funnels attacker-influenced permission scopes (from a request body, a JWT claim, or other external input) into encode/3 therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node with system_limit, taking down every application running on it.<br /> <br /> The default encoder is Guardian.Permissions.BitwiseEncoding, which is not affected.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input.<br /> <br /> Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions.<br /> <br /> String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain a denial of service vulnerability in the CookieJar that accepts unlimited Set-Cookie header fields with no size restrictions. Attackers can return many large cookies from a malicious server, causing Guzzle to store excessive data in memory and generate oversized Cookie headers that fail in handlers or destination servers.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 fail to preserve host-only cookie scope, storing the request host in the Domain field instead of marking cookies as host-only. Attackers controlling child hosts can receive host-only cookies intended only for parent hosts, potentially disclosing session identifiers and authorization tokens when the same cookie jar is reused across trust boundaries.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 fail to enforce scripting authorization checks on the SQL DEFINE FUNCTION statement with LANGUAGE js. Attackers with database access can execute arbitrary JavaScript code by submitting DEFINE FUNCTION statements, bypassing security controls intended to restrict scripting to administrators.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** ArcadeDB versions before 26.7.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in HTTP handlers for time series, batch, Prometheus, and Grafana endpoints that fail to validate database access permissions. Attackers can access and modify databases they are not authorized to use by directly calling affected endpoints with arbitrary database parameters.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** ArcadeDB before 26.7.2 fails to enforce the UPDATE_SCHEMA database permission on the ALTER TYPE ... CUSTOM and ALTER TYPE ... BUCKETSELECTIONSTRATEGY SQL operations, which map to setCustomValue and setBucketSelectionStrategy in LocalDocumentType. An authenticated user with only read access (e.g., a read-only API token) can submit these ALTER TYPE statements via the HTTP command endpoint to mutate a type&amp;#39;s custom schema metadata and bucket-selection strategy, bypassing the documented updateSchema permission boundary and potentially corrupting schema metadata and record routing.