Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ext4: fix use-after-free read in ext4_find_extent for bigalloc + inline<br /> <br /> Syzbot found the following issue:<br /> loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2048<br /> EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 without journal. Quota mode: none.<br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_ext_binsearch_idx fs/ext4/extents.c:768 [inline]<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_find_extent+0x76e/0xd90 fs/ext4/extents.c:931<br /> Read of size 4 at addr ffff888073644750 by task syz-executor420/5067<br /> <br /> CPU: 0 PID: 5067 Comm: syz-executor420 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]<br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106<br /> print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306<br /> print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417<br /> kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517<br /> ext4_ext_binsearch_idx fs/ext4/extents.c:768 [inline]<br /> ext4_find_extent+0x76e/0xd90 fs/ext4/extents.c:931<br /> ext4_clu_mapped+0x117/0x970 fs/ext4/extents.c:5809<br /> ext4_insert_delayed_block fs/ext4/inode.c:1696 [inline]<br /> ext4_da_map_blocks fs/ext4/inode.c:1806 [inline]<br /> ext4_da_get_block_prep+0x9e8/0x13c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1870<br /> ext4_block_write_begin+0x6a8/0x2290 fs/ext4/inode.c:1098<br /> ext4_da_write_begin+0x539/0x760 fs/ext4/inode.c:3082<br /> generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772<br /> ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x122/0x3a0 fs/ext4/file.c:285<br /> ext4_file_write_iter+0x1d0/0x18f0<br /> call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline]<br /> new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]<br /> vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584<br /> ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> RIP: 0033:0x7f4b7a9737b9<br /> RSP: 002b:00007ffc5cac3668 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001<br /> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f4b7a9737b9<br /> RDX: 00000000175d9003 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000004<br /> RBP: 00007f4b7a933050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: 000000000000079f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4b7a9330e0<br /> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000<br /> <br /> <br /> Above issue is happens when enable bigalloc and inline data feature. As<br /> commit 131294c35ed6 fixed delayed allocation bug in ext4_clu_mapped for<br /> bigalloc + inline. But it only resolved issue when has inline data, if<br /> inline data has been converted to extent(ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent)<br /> before writepages, there is no EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag. However<br /> i_data is still store inline data in this scene. Then will trigger UAF<br /> when find extent.<br /> To resolve above issue, there is need to add judge "ext4_has_inline_data(inode)"<br /> in ext4_clu_mapped().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> btrfs: call __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache_locked on cache load failure<br /> <br /> Now that lockdep is staying enabled through our entire CI runs I started<br /> seeing the following stack in generic/475<br /> <br /> ------------[ cut here ]------------<br /> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2171864 at fs/btrfs/discard.c:604 btrfs_discard_update_discardable+0x98/0xb0<br /> CPU: 1 PID: 2171864 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #789<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014<br /> Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_work_helper<br /> RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_update_discardable+0x98/0xb0<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffb857c2f7bad0 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c85c605c200 RCX: 0000000000000001<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff86807c5b RDI: ffffffff868a831e<br /> RBP: ffff8c85c4c54000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: ffff8c85c66932f0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8c85c3899010<br /> R13: ffff8c85d5be4f40 R14: ffff8c85c4c54000 R15: ffff8c86114bfa80<br /> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c863bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 00007f2e7f168160 CR3: 000000010289a004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache+0x27/0x30<br /> load_free_space_cache+0xad2/0xaf0<br /> caching_thread+0x40b/0x650<br /> ? lock_release+0x137/0x2d0<br /> btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0<br /> ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140<br /> process_one_work+0x271/0x590<br /> ? process_one_work+0x590/0x590<br /> worker_thread+0x52/0x3b0<br /> ? process_one_work+0x590/0x590<br /> kthread+0xf0/0x120<br /> ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20<br /> ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30<br /> <br /> This is the code<br /> <br /> ctl = block_group-&gt;free_space_ctl;<br /> discard_ctl = &amp;block_group-&gt;fs_info-&gt;discard_ctl;<br /> <br /> lockdep_assert_held(&amp;ctl-&gt;tree_lock);<br /> <br /> We have a temporary free space ctl for loading the free space cache in<br /> order to avoid having allocations happening while we&amp;#39;re loading the<br /> cache. When we hit an error we free it all up, however this also calls<br /> btrfs_discard_update_discardable, which requires<br /> block_group-&gt;free_space_ctl-&gt;tree_lock to be held. However this is our<br /> temporary ctl so this lock isn&amp;#39;t held. Fix this by calling<br /> __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache_locked instead so that we only clean up<br /> the entries and do not mess with the discardable stats.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ASoC: audio-graph-card: fix refcount leak of cpu_ep in __graph_for_each_link()<br /> <br /> The of_get_next_child() returns a node with refcount incremented, and<br /> decrements the refcount of prev. So in the error path of the while loop,<br /> of_node_put() needs be called for cpu_ep.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix mt7915_rate_txpower_get() resource leaks<br /> <br /> Coverity message: variable "buf" going out of scope leaks the storage.<br /> <br /> Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1527799 ("Resource leaks")

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/omap: dss: Fix refcount leak bugs<br /> <br /> In dss_init_ports() and __dss_uninit_ports(), we should call<br /> of_node_put() for the reference returned by of_graph_get_port_by_id()<br /> in fail path or when it is not used anymore.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> xen/privcmd: Fix a possible warning in privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource()<br /> <br /> As &amp;#39;kdata.num&amp;#39; is user-controlled data, if user tries to allocate<br /> memory larger than(&gt;=) MAX_ORDER, then kcalloc() will fail, it<br /> creates a stack trace and messes up dmesg with a warning.<br /> <br /> Call trace:<br /> -&gt; privcmd_ioctl<br /> --&gt; privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource<br /> <br /> Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning.<br /> This is detected by static analysis using smatch.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> serial: pch: Fix PCI device refcount leak in pch_request_dma()<br /> <br /> As comment of pci_get_slot() says, it returns a pci_device with its<br /> refcount increased. The caller must decrement the reference count by<br /> calling pci_dev_put().<br /> <br /> Since &amp;#39;dma_dev&amp;#39; is only used to filter the channel in filter(), we can<br /> call pci_dev_put() before exiting from pch_request_dma(). Add the<br /> missing pci_dev_put() for the normal and error path.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()<br /> <br /> Commit f3cc6b25dcc5 ("ima: always measure and audit files in policy") lets<br /> measurement or audit happen even if the file digest cannot be calculated.<br /> <br /> As a result, iint-&gt;ima_hash could have been allocated despite<br /> ima_collect_measurement() returning an error.<br /> <br /> Since ima_hash belongs to a temporary inode metadata structure, declared<br /> at the beginning of __ima_inode_hash(), just add a kfree() call if<br /> ima_collect_measurement() returns an error different from -ENOMEM (in that<br /> case, ima_hash should not have been allocated).

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> class: fix possible memory leak in __class_register()<br /> <br /> If class_add_groups() returns error, the &amp;#39;cp-&gt;subsys&amp;#39; need be<br /> unregister, and the &amp;#39;cp&amp;#39; need be freed.<br /> <br /> We can not call kset_unregister() here, because the &amp;#39;cls&amp;#39; will<br /> be freed in callback function class_release() and it&amp;#39;s also<br /> freed in caller&amp;#39;s error path, it will cause double free.<br /> <br /> So fix this by calling kobject_del() and kfree_const(name) to<br /> cleanup kobject. Besides, call kfree() to free the &amp;#39;cp&amp;#39;.<br /> <br /> Fault injection test can trigger this:<br /> <br /> unreferenced object 0xffff888102fa8190 (size 8):<br /> comm "modprobe", pid 502, jiffies 4294906074 (age 49.296s)<br /> hex dump (first 8 bytes):<br /> 70 6b 74 63 64 76 64 00 pktcdvd.<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x1ae/0x320<br /> [] kstrdup+0x3a/0x70<br /> [] kstrdup_const+0x68/0x80<br /> [] kvasprintf_const+0x10b/0x190<br /> [] kobject_set_name_vargs+0x56/0x150<br /> [] kobject_set_name+0xab/0xe0<br /> [] __class_register+0x15c/0x49a<br /> <br /> unreferenced object 0xffff888037274000 (size 1024):<br /> comm "modprobe", pid 502, jiffies 4294906074 (age 49.296s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 00 40 27 37 80 88 ff ff 00 40 27 37 80 88 ff ff .@&amp;#39;7.....@&amp;#39;7....<br /> 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x17c/0x2f0<br /> [] __class_register+0x86/0x49a

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> arm64: ftrace: fix module PLTs with mcount<br /> <br /> Li Huafei reports that mcount-based ftrace with module PLTs was broken<br /> by commit:<br /> <br /> a6253579977e4c6f ("arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.")<br /> <br /> When a module PLTs are used and a module is loaded sufficiently far away<br /> from the kernel, we&amp;#39;ll create PLTs for any branches which are<br /> out-of-range. These are separate from the special ftrace trampoline<br /> PLTs, which the module PLT code doesn&amp;#39;t directly manipulate.<br /> <br /> When mcount is in use this is a problem, as each mcount callsite in a<br /> module will be initialized to point to a module PLT, but since commit<br /> a6253579977e4c6f ftrace_make_nop() will assume that the callsite has<br /> been initialized to point to the special ftrace trampoline PLT, and<br /> ftrace_find_callable_addr() rejects other cases.<br /> <br /> This means that when ftrace tries to initialize a callsite via<br /> ftrace_make_nop(), the call to ftrace_find_callable_addr() will find<br /> that the `_mcount` stub is out-of-range and is not handled by the ftrace<br /> PLT, resulting in a splat:<br /> <br /> | ftrace_test: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.<br /> | ftrace: no module PLT for _mcount<br /> | ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------<br /> | ftrace failed to modify<br /> | [] 0xffff800029180014<br /> | actual: 44:00:00:94<br /> | Initializing ftrace call sites<br /> | ftrace record flags: 2000000<br /> | (0)<br /> | expected tramp: ffff80000802eb3c<br /> | ------------[ cut here ]------------<br /> | WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 157 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2120 ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270<br /> | Modules linked in:<br /> | CPU: 3 PID: 157 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.0.0-rc6-00151-gcd722513a189-dirty #22<br /> | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)<br /> | pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)<br /> | pc : ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270<br /> | lr : ftrace_bug+0x21c/0x270<br /> | sp : ffff80000b2bbaf0<br /> | x29: ffff80000b2bbaf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff0000c4d38000<br /> | x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff800009d7e000 x24: ffff0000c4d86e00<br /> | x23: 0000000002000000 x22: ffff80000a62b000 x21: ffff8000098ebea8<br /> | x20: ffff0000c4d38000 x19: ffff80000aa24158 x18: ffffffffffffffff<br /> | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0a0d2d2d2d2d2d2d x15: ffff800009aa9118<br /> | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 6333626532303830 x12: 3030303866666666<br /> | x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : 3362653230383030<br /> | x8 : c0000000ffffefff x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : 000000000000bff4<br /> | x5 : 0000000000057fa8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001<br /> | x2 : ad2cb14bb5438900 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000022<br /> | Call trace:<br /> | ftrace_bug+0x94/0x270<br /> | ftrace_process_locs+0x308/0x430<br /> | ftrace_module_init+0x44/0x60<br /> | load_module+0x15b4/0x1ce8<br /> | __do_sys_init_module+0x1ec/0x238<br /> | __arm64_sys_init_module+0x24/0x30<br /> | invoke_syscall+0x54/0x118<br /> | el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x84/0x100<br /> | do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0<br /> | el0_svc+0x1c/0x50<br /> | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8<br /> | el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160<br /> | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---<br /> | ---------test_init-----------<br /> <br /> Fix this by reverting to the old behaviour of ignoring the old<br /> instruction when initialising an mcount callsite in a module, which was<br /> the behaviour prior to commit a6253579977e4c6f.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> dm thin: Fix UAF in run_timer_softirq()<br /> <br /> When dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent, it will<br /> lead to UAF, as follows:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __run_timers+0x173/0x710<br /> Write of size 8 at addr ffff88816d9490f0 by task swapper/0/0<br /> <br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f<br /> print_report.cold+0x132/0xaa2<br /> _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xcd/0x160<br /> __run_timers+0x173/0x710<br /> kasan_report+0xad/0x110<br /> __run_timers+0x173/0x710<br /> __asan_store8+0x9c/0x140<br /> __run_timers+0x173/0x710<br /> call_timer_fn+0x310/0x310<br /> pvclock_clocksource_read+0xfa/0x250<br /> kvm_clock_read+0x2c/0x70<br /> kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x20<br /> ktime_get+0x5c/0x110<br /> lapic_next_event+0x38/0x50<br /> clockevents_program_event+0xf1/0x1e0<br /> run_timer_softirq+0x49/0x90<br /> __do_softirq+0x16e/0x62c<br /> __irq_exit_rcu+0x1fa/0x270<br /> irq_exit_rcu+0x12/0x20<br /> sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0<br /> <br /> One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:<br /> <br /> use free<br /> do_resume |<br /> __find_device_hash_cell |<br /> dm_get |<br /> atomic_inc(&amp;md-&gt;holders) |<br /> | dm_destroy<br /> | __dm_destroy<br /> | if (!dm_suspended_md(md))<br /> | atomic_read(&amp;md-&gt;holders)<br /> | msleep(1)<br /> dm_resume |<br /> __dm_resume |<br /> dm_table_resume_targets |<br /> pool_resume |<br /> do_waker #add delay work |<br /> dm_put |<br /> atomic_dec(&amp;md-&gt;holders) |<br /> | dm_table_destroy<br /> | pool_dtr<br /> | __pool_dec<br /> | __pool_destroy<br /> | destroy_workqueue<br /> | kfree(pool) # free pool<br /> time out<br /> __do_softirq<br /> run_timer_softirq # pool has already been freed<br /> <br /> This can be easily reproduced using:<br /> 1. create thin-pool<br /> 2. dmsetup suspend pool<br /> 3. dmsetup resume pool<br /> 4. dmsetup remove_all # Concurrent with 3<br /> <br /> The root cause of this UAF bug is that dm_resume() adds timer after<br /> dm_destroy() skips cancelling the timer because of suspend status.<br /> After timeout, it will call run_timer_softirq(), however pool has<br /> already been freed. The concurrency UAF bug will happen.<br /> <br /> Therefore, cancelling timer again in __pool_destroy().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()<br /> <br /> With clang&amp;#39;s kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),<br /> indirect call targets are validated against the expected function<br /> pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate<br /> ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,<br /> which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A<br /> proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which<br /> reveals:<br /> <br /> drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c:1854:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing &amp;#39;netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)&amp;#39; (aka &amp;#39;enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)&amp;#39;) with an expression of type &amp;#39;int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)&amp;#39; [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]<br /> .ndo_start_xmit = netiucv_tx,<br /> ^~~~~~~~~~<br /> <br /> -&gt;ndo_start_xmit() in &amp;#39;struct net_device_ops&amp;#39; expects a return type of<br /> &amp;#39;netdev_tx_t&amp;#39;, not &amp;#39;int&amp;#39;. Adjust the return type of netiucv_tx() to<br /> match the prototype&amp;#39;s to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure,<br /> should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.<br /> <br /> Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no<br /> longer relevant.