Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A vulnerability was identified in bytebot-ai bytebot 0.0.1. The affected element is an unknown function of the component Agent Execution Workflow. Such manipulation leads to infinite loop. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** TypeORM's SelectQueryBuilder.distinctOn accepts an array of strings and stores it on the expression map without validation. For PostgreSQL-family drivers, createSelectDistinctExpression in src/query-builder/SelectQueryBuilder.ts joins that array and interpolates the result into the generated statement as SELECT DISTINCT ON (values), with no escaping, quoting, identifier validation or allowlist, and without routing the values through replacePropertyNames or the driver's escape helper. Because the interpolation point is a parenthesized SQL expression list rather than an identifier-only position, a supplied element may carry arbitrary expressions, including correlated subqueries. An application that forwards a client-controlled value into distinctOn, for instance to let a caller choose a deduplication column, allows that client to read data anywhere the application's database role can reach through boolean or time-based inference, independently of the entity being queried. validateOrderByCondition, the allowlist check guarding the orderBy family in the same class, is not applied to this path.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Arbitrary account takeover in miniOrange OAuth Client

*** Pendiente de traducción *** webpack-dev-middleware resolves a request to a local file in getFilenameFromUrl by testing the request pathname against a traversal guard and then slicing it at a fixed character offset. The guard, UP_PATH_REGEXP applied to path.normalize(`./${pathname}`), only matches ".." that stands as a whole path segment, while the containment test is the string comparison pathname.startsWith(publicPathPathname) and the file path is built as path.join(outputPath, pathname.slice(publicPathPathname.length)). When the configured publicPath has no trailing slash, a request such as GET /assets../.env against publicPath /assets yields the pathname /assets../.env, whose only dot-dot sits inside the segment "assets.." and so passes the guard, but the offset slice cuts within that segment and hands "../.env" to path.join, resolving one directory above outputPath. Reading a file from that path requires the middleware to be backed by the physical filesystem, which happens when writeToDisk is true or a custom outputFileSystem is supplied, since the default memfs volume holds only build output. Traversal depth is limited to a single directory because a separately delimited dot-dot segment is collapsed during URL parsing before the guard runs. The default publicPath value of "auto" resolves to "/" and is not affected. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-29180: the guard and offset slice were introduced by that fix and are present in every release from 5.3.4, 6.1.2 and 7.1.0 onward.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** act starts an HTTP Artifacts V4 backend whenever a workflow uses actions/upload-artifact@v4 or actions/download-artifact@v4. The control-plane RPCs of that backend, including CreateArtifact, GetSignedArtifactURL, ListArtifacts, FinalizeArtifact and DeleteArtifact, accept a caller-supplied workflow_run_backend_id and never check that it belongs to the requester: validateRunIDV4 in pkg/artifacts/artifacts_v4.go parses the value and returns it with the comparison against the requesting task's run ID left commented out. The signed URLs the backend issues are authenticated by an HMAC whose key is hardcoded to the four bytes 0xba 0xdb 0xee 0xf0, identical in every build, computed over a concatenation of endpoint, expiry, artifact name and task ID with no length prefix or delimiter, so signatures are both forgeable and ambiguous between differing artifact name and task ID pairs. The --artifact-server-addr flag defaults to the host's outbound address rather than loopback, leaving the backend reachable from the surrounding network. Any client that can reach it may read, overwrite or delete the artifacts of a concurrently running job with no credentials, exposing build outputs such as secrets and deployment credentials and permitting their replacement before the owning job consumes them.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The official Flair wheels for 0.15.0 and 0.15.1 still contain flair/models/clustering.py, whose ClusteringModel.load static method returns pickle.loads(joblib.load(str(model_file))) and so executes arbitrary Python while loading a model file. Loading a model supplied by an attacker therefore runs that attacker's code with the privileges of the loading process. This is the same sink and the same file as CVE-2024-10073, which records 0.15.0 as the fixed version on the basis that clustering support was dropped in that release; the module was removed from the documented API but remains present in the distributed artifact and reachable by importing flair.models.clustering directly, so the earlier record's fixed version does not hold for the shipped package.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** adm-zip 0.5.9 through 0.6.0 follows symbolic links at the extraction destination. Utils.sanitize in util/utils.js enforces containment by comparing only the string form of an archive entry name against the resolved extraction root, and Utils.writeFileTo opens the computed destination with fs.openSync(path, "w", 0o666), which resolves symbolic links and carries neither O_NOFOLLOW nor a pre-write fs.lstatSync check. When a path component at the destination already exists as a symbolic link pointing outside the extraction root, extractAllTo, extractAllToAsync and extractEntryTo write the entry contents through that link and then chmod its target, placing attacker-controlled content in a file outside the root without any traversal sequence appearing in the archive. Reaching the write requires overwrite to be enabled, because the preceding fs.existsSync check also resolves the link and otherwise declines. An attacker able to create a symbolic link inside a shared, reused or predictable extraction directory, such as a temporary directory or a continuous integration workspace, can overwrite any file the extracting process is permitted to write.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Xinference loads models with Hugging Face remote code execution unconditionally enabled, and before version 2.12.0 exposes no setting to disable it. Six loader call sites pass trust_remote_code=True as a literal or as an unconditional default: RerankModel._get_tokenizer in xinference/model/rerank/core.py, SentenceTransformerRerankModel.load in xinference/model/rerank/sentence_transformers/core.py, SentenceTransformerEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/sentence_transformers/core.py, FlagEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/flag/core.py, and two sites in xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py where PytorchModel._sanitize_model_config and PytorchModel._get_components default the value to True. Because a caller with model launch access can register a model whose type is unknown and supply an arbitrary model path, the server reaches _auto_detect_type and then AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained, which imports and executes Python declared by the model directory's own tokenizer_config.json auto_map, running attacker-supplied code with the privileges of the worker process. Version 2.12.0 gates every site behind allow_trust_remote_code and the XINFERENCE_TRUST_REMOTE_CODE setting, permitting remote code only for bundled built-in models.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The Mercado Pago Node.js SDK interpolates caller-supplied identifiers into API request paths without percent-encoding them, so characters that are structural in a URL survive into the outgoing request. The payment (get, capture, cancel), paymentRefund (create, total, list, get), advancedPayment (get, capture, cancel, update, updateReleaseDate) and disbursementRefund (create, createAll, listAll) clients build their path as a template literal, for example RestClient.fetch(`/v1/payments/${id}`, ...) in src/clients/payment/get/index.ts. A dot-dot or slash sequence in the identifier is normalised by the WHATWG URL parser and redirects the request to a different endpoint, and a question mark appends attacker-chosen query parameters, in both cases carrying the merchant's own access token. An application that forwards an identifier influenced by an untrusted party into one of these methods without an ownership check therefore allows that party to reach other resources within the merchant's token scope. The repository already contains the intended helper, encodePathParam in src/utils/path.ts, which pull request 451 applied to roughly 29 other clients while leaving these unchanged.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** RustDesk's Windows clipboard redirection copies a peer-supplied length into a fixed-size caller buffer without an upper bound check. When an OLE paste consumer such as explorer.exe calls IStream::Read with a buffer of cb bytes, CliprdrStream_Read in libs/clipboard/src/windows/wf_cliprdr.c requests that many bytes of a remote file through cliprdr_send_request_filecontents and then executes CopyMemory(pv, clipboard->req_fdata, clipboard->req_fsize), where req_fsize is taken verbatim from the peer's CLIPRDR FileContentsResponse by wf_cliprdr_server_file_contents_response (req_fsize = fileContentsResponse->cbRequested) and is never clamped to cb anywhere in the chain. The function's only length comparison, req_fsize

*** Pendiente de traducción *** phpIPAM before 1.8.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the REST API that allows unauthenticated attackers to gain full API access by exploiting an insecure object cache keying mechanism. The cache is keyed by lookup value alone without including the searched column, enabling an entry written during an app_id lookup to satisfy a subsequent app_code lookup, allowing attackers to use the numeric database row identifier as an API token to read, write, and delete all IP address management records.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Multiple vulnerabilities on affected versions of Zscaler Client Connector allow local privilege escalation, giving an unprivileged user the ability to execute arbitrary code in a privileged context.