Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> LoongArch: BPF: Fix jump offset calculation in tailcall<br /> <br /> The extra pass of bpf_int_jit_compile() skips JIT context initialization<br /> which essentially skips offset calculation leaving out_offset = -1, so<br /> the jmp_offset in emit_bpf_tail_call is calculated by<br /> <br /> "#define jmp_offset (out_offset - (cur_offset))"<br /> <br /> is a negative number, which is wrong. The final generated assembly are<br /> as follow.<br /> <br /> 54: bgeu $a2, $t1, -8 # 0x0000004c<br /> 58: addi.d $a6, $s5, -1<br /> 5c: bltz $a6, -16 # 0x0000004c<br /> 60: alsl.d $t2, $a2, $a1, 0x3<br /> 64: ld.d $t2, $t2, 264<br /> 68: beq $t2, $zero, -28 # 0x0000004c<br /> <br /> Before apply this patch, the follow test case will reveal soft lock issues.<br /> <br /> cd tools/testing/selftests/bpf/<br /> ./test_progs --allow=tailcalls/tailcall_bpf2bpf_1<br /> <br /> dmesg:<br /> watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [test_progs:25056]

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: ftgmac100: fix potential NULL pointer access in ftgmac100_phy_disconnect<br /> <br /> After the call to phy_disconnect() netdev-&gt;phydev is reset to NULL.<br /> So fixed_phy_unregister() would be called with a NULL pointer as argument.<br /> Therefore cache the phy_device before this call.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump<br /> <br /> There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():<br /> if (res ct_general); // HERE<br /> cb-&gt;args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;<br /> ...<br /> <br /> While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.<br /> If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.<br /> This 2nd increment is never undone.<br /> <br /> This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn<br /> keeps prevents cnet-&gt;count from dropping back to 0.<br /> <br /> This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as<br /> nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.<br /> <br /> This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.<br /> It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before<br /> I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.<br /> <br /> One fix would to change this to:<br /> if (res ct_general);<br /> <br /> But this reference counting isn&amp;#39;t needed in the first place.<br /> We can just store a cookie value instead.<br /> <br /> A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,<br /> it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like<br /> ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a &amp;#39;skip hint&amp;#39;, not the actual<br /> object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: hibmcge: fix rtnl deadlock issue<br /> <br /> Currently, the hibmcge netdev acquires the rtnl_lock in<br /> pci_error_handlers.reset_prepare() and releases it in<br /> pci_error_handlers.reset_done().<br /> <br /> However, in the PCI framework:<br /> pci_reset_bus - __pci_reset_slot - pci_slot_save_and_disable_locked -<br /> pci_dev_save_and_disable - err_handler-&gt;reset_prepare(dev);<br /> <br /> In pci_slot_save_and_disable_locked():<br /> list_for_each_entry(dev, &amp;slot-&gt;bus-&gt;devices, bus_list) {<br /> if (!dev-&gt;slot || dev-&gt;slot!= slot)<br /> continue;<br /> pci_dev_save_and_disable(dev);<br /> if (dev-&gt;subordinate)<br /> pci_bus_save_and_disable_locked(dev-&gt;subordinate);<br /> }<br /> <br /> This will iterate through all devices under the current bus and execute<br /> err_handler-&gt;reset_prepare(), causing two devices of the hibmcge driver<br /> to sequentially request the rtnl_lock, leading to a deadlock.<br /> <br /> Since the driver now executes netif_device_detach()<br /> before the reset process, it will not concurrently with<br /> other netdev APIs, so there is no need to hold the rtnl_lock now.<br /> <br /> Therefore, this patch removes the rtnl_lock during the reset process and<br /> adjusts the position of HBG_NIC_STATE_RESETTING to ensure<br /> that multiple resets are not executed concurrently.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()<br /> <br /> As soon as we&amp;#39;d inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another<br /> thread could close it. That&amp;#39;s fine for the case when all we are doing is<br /> returning that descriptor to userland (it&amp;#39;s a race, but it&amp;#39;s a userland<br /> race and there&amp;#39;s nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we<br /> follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be<br /> destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed<br /> by its -&gt;release()), we have a UAF.<br /> <br /> dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().<br /> habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the<br /> objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to<br /> another struct file that will be dropped as part of -&gt;release() for ours;<br /> that "will be" is actually "might have already been".<br /> <br /> Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install()<br /> only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer<br /> have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to<br /> underlying file (as well as -&gt;dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet;<br /> unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can&amp;#39;t fail.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> hfs: fix general protection fault in hfs_find_init()<br /> <br /> The hfs_find_init() method can trigger the crash<br /> if tree pointer is NULL:<br /> <br /> [ 45.746290][ T9787] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KAI<br /> [ 45.747287][ T9787] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047]<br /> [ 45.748716][ T9787] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9787 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(full)<br /> [ 45.750250][ T9787] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014<br /> [ 45.751983][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230<br /> [ 45.752834][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc<br /> [ 45.755574][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202<br /> [ 45.756432][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09<br /> [ 45.757457][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8<br /> [ 45.758282][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> [ 45.758943][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004<br /> [ 45.759619][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000<br /> [ 45.760293][ T9787] FS: 00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> [ 45.761050][ T9787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> [ 45.761606][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0<br /> [ 45.762286][ T9787] Call Trace:<br /> [ 45.762570][ T9787] <br /> [ 45.762824][ T9787] hfs_ext_read_extent+0x190/0x9d0<br /> [ 45.763269][ T9787] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x2dd/0xce0<br /> [ 45.763766][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_ext_read_extent+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.764250][ T9787] hfs_get_block+0x55f/0x830<br /> [ 45.764646][ T9787] block_read_full_folio+0x36d/0x850<br /> [ 45.765105][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_get_block+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.765541][ T9787] ? const_folio_flags+0x5b/0x100<br /> [ 45.765972][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.766415][ T9787] filemap_read_folio+0xbe/0x290<br /> [ 45.766840][ T9787] ? __pfx_filemap_read_folio+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.767325][ T9787] ? __filemap_get_folio+0x32b/0xbf0<br /> [ 45.767780][ T9787] do_read_cache_folio+0x263/0x5c0<br /> [ 45.768223][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.768666][ T9787] read_cache_page+0x5b/0x160<br /> [ 45.769070][ T9787] hfs_btree_open+0x491/0x1740<br /> [ 45.769481][ T9787] hfs_mdb_get+0x15e2/0x1fb0<br /> [ 45.769877][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_mdb_get+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.770316][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80<br /> [ 45.770731][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280<br /> [ 45.771200][ T9787] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280<br /> [ 45.771674][ T9787] hfs_fill_super+0x38e/0x720<br /> [ 45.772092][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.772549][ T9787] ? snprintf+0xbe/0x100<br /> [ 45.772931][ T9787] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.773350][ T9787] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x2b0<br /> [ 45.773796][ T9787] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80<br /> [ 45.774215][ T9787] ? set_blocksize+0x40a/0x510<br /> [ 45.774636][ T9787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x176/0x1d0<br /> [ 45.775087][ T9787] ? setup_bdev_super+0x369/0x730<br /> [ 45.775533][ T9787] get_tree_bdev_flags+0x384/0x620<br /> [ 45.775985][ T9787] ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.776453][ T9787] ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.776950][ T9787] ? bpf_lsm_capable+0x9/0x10<br /> [ 45.777365][ T9787] ? security_capable+0x80/0x260<br /> [ 45.777803][ T9787] vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x340<br /> [ 45.778203][ T9787] path_mount+0x13de/0x2010<br /> [ 45.778604][ T9787] ? kmem_cache_free+0x2b0/0x4c0<br /> [ 45.779052][ T9787] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.779480][ T9787] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550<br /> [ 45.779954][ T9787] ? putname+0x154/0x1a0<br /> [ 45.780335][ T9787] __x64_sys_mount+0x27b/0x300<br /> [ 45.780758][ T9787] ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 45.781232][ T9787] <br /> ---truncated---

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: kcm: Fix race condition in kcm_unattach()<br /> <br /> syzbot found a race condition when kcm_unattach(psock)<br /> and kcm_release(kcm) are executed at the same time.<br /> <br /> kcm_unattach() is missing a check of the flag<br /> kcm-&gt;tx_stopped before calling queue_work().<br /> <br /> If the kcm has a reserved psock, kcm_unattach() might get executed<br /> between cancel_work_sync() and unreserve_psock() in kcm_release(),<br /> requeuing kcm-&gt;tx_work right before kcm gets freed in kcm_done().<br /> <br /> Remove kcm-&gt;tx_stopped and replace it by the less<br /> error-prone disable_work_sync().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: hibmcge: fix the division by zero issue<br /> <br /> When the network port is down, the queue is released, and ring-&gt;len is 0.<br /> In debugfs, hbg_get_queue_used_num() will be called,<br /> which may lead to a division by zero issue.<br /> <br /> This patch adds a check, if ring-&gt;len is 0,<br /> hbg_get_queue_used_num() directly returns 0.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv<br /> <br /> A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the<br /> original head skb. It&amp;#39;s not safe to access these frag skbs.<br /> <br /> syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this:<br /> <br /> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211<br /> sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211<br /> sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998<br /> sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88<br /> sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331<br /> sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122<br /> __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106<br /> release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660<br /> sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360<br /> sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885<br /> sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031<br /> inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]<br /> <br /> and<br /> <br /> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987<br /> sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987<br /> sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88<br /> sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331<br /> sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148<br /> __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213<br /> release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767<br /> sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367<br /> sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886<br /> sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032<br /> inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]<br /> <br /> This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read()<br /> <br /> The hfsplus_bnode_read() method can trigger the issue:<br /> <br /> [ 174.852007][ T9784] ==================================================================<br /> [ 174.852709][ T9784] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360<br /> [ 174.853412][ T9784] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b5fc6c0 by task repro/9784<br /> [ 174.854059][ T9784]<br /> [ 174.854272][ T9784] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9784 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #7 PREEMPT(full)<br /> [ 174.854281][ T9784] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014<br /> [ 174.854286][ T9784] Call Trace:<br /> [ 174.854289][ T9784] <br /> [ 174.854292][ T9784] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0<br /> [ 174.854305][ T9784] print_report+0xd0/0x660<br /> [ 174.854315][ T9784] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610<br /> [ 174.854323][ T9784] ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180<br /> [ 174.854330][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360<br /> [ 174.854337][ T9784] kasan_report+0xc6/0x100<br /> [ 174.854346][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360<br /> [ 174.854354][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360<br /> [ 174.854362][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x2ec/0x380<br /> [ 174.854370][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854377][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_write_u16+0x83/0xb0<br /> [ 174.854385][ T9784] ? srcu_gp_start+0xd0/0x310<br /> [ 174.854393][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40<br /> [ 174.854402][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_remove+0x3d2/0x4e0<br /> [ 174.854411][ T9784] __hfsplus_delete_attr+0x290/0x3a0<br /> [ 174.854419][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfs_find_1st_rec_by_cnid+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854427][ T9784] ? __pfx___hfsplus_delete_attr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854436][ T9784] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50<br /> [ 174.854450][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x262/0x320<br /> [ 174.854459][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854469][ T9784] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0<br /> [ 174.854476][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40<br /> [ 174.854483][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0<br /> [ 174.854493][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_cat+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854507][ T9784] hfsplus_unlink+0x1ca/0x7c0<br /> [ 174.854516][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_unlink+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854525][ T9784] ? down_write+0x148/0x200<br /> [ 174.854532][ T9784] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854540][ T9784] vfs_unlink+0x2fe/0x9b0<br /> [ 174.854549][ T9784] do_unlinkat+0x490/0x670<br /> [ 174.854557][ T9784] ? __pfx_do_unlinkat+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 174.854565][ T9784] ? __might_fault+0xbc/0x130<br /> [ 174.854576][ T9784] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550<br /> [ 174.854584][ T9784] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110<br /> [ 174.854592][ T9784] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480<br /> [ 174.854600][ T9784] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f<br /> [ 174.854608][ T9784] RIP: 0033:0x7f6fdf4c3167<br /> [ 174.854614][ T9784] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 26 0d 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 08<br /> [ 174.854622][ T9784] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb948bca8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057<br /> [ 174.854630][ T9784] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6fdf4c3167<br /> [ 174.854636][ T9784] RDX: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RSI: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RDI: 00007ffcb948bd50<br /> [ 174.854641][ T9784] RBP: 00007ffcb948cd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffcb948bb40<br /> [ 174.854645][ T9784] R10: 00007f6fdf564fc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561e1bc9c2d0<br /> [ 174.854650][ T9784] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000<br /> [ 174.854658][ T9784] <br /> [ 174.854661][ T9784]<br /> [ 174.879281][ T9784] Allocated by task 9784:<br /> [ 174.879664][ T9784] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40<br /> [ 174.880082][ T9784] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30<br /> [ 174.880500][ T9784] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0<br /> [ 174.880908][ T9784] __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550<br /> [ 174.881337][ T9784] __hfs_bnode_create+0x107/0x890<br /> [ 174.881779][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_find+0x2d0/0xd10<br /> [ 174.882222][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_find+0x2b0/0x520<br /> [ 174.882659][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x23b/0x3<br /> ---truncated---

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> smb/server: avoid deadlock when linking with ReplaceIfExists<br /> <br /> If smb2_create_link() is called with ReplaceIfExists set and the name<br /> does exist then a deadlock will happen.<br /> <br /> ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_locked() will return with success and the parent<br /> directory will be locked. ksmbd_vfs_remove_file() will then remove the<br /> file. ksmbd_vfs_link() will then be called while the parent is still<br /> locked. It will try to lock the same parent and will deadlock.<br /> <br /> This patch moves the ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_unlock() call to *before*<br /> ksmbd_vfs_link() and then simplifies the code, removing the file_present<br /> flag variable.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> hfsplus: don&amp;#39;t use BUG_ON() in hfsplus_create_attributes_file()<br /> <br /> When the volume header contains erroneous values that do not reflect<br /> the actual state of the filesystem, hfsplus_fill_super() assumes that<br /> the attributes file is not yet created, which later results in hitting<br /> BUG_ON() when hfsplus_create_attributes_file() is called. Replace this<br /> BUG_ON() with -EIO error with a message to suggest running fsck tool.