Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** entr is vulnerable to Heap-based buffer overflow in run_utility() function. The function allocates a fixed-size heap buffer using malloc(ARG_MAX) and copies command-line arguments into it. It advances the destination pointer based on the return value of strlcpy(), which returns the total length of the source string rather than the number of bytes written. When the buffer is exactly filled, the remaining size underflows as an unsigned size_t, causing subsequent copies to write out of bounds. This can be triggered by supplying command-line arguments whose combined length fills the buffer, or via the /_ substitution feature which expands a short token into a longer pathname at runtime. The local attacker can cause memory corruption, process abort, and denial of service. <br /> <br /> <br /> This issue was fixed in commit 2467fe0

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A flaw was found in StackRox/RHACS Central&amp;#39;s Auth Machine-to-Machine (M2M) token exchange. When an administrator configures M2M role mappings, the system uses unanchored regular expressions for matching claim values. This allows an attacker with a valid OpenID Connect (OIDC) token, whose claim value is a superstring of a configured pattern, to gain unauthorized access to roles they were not intended to receive. This can lead to privilege escalation within the system.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (&amp;#39;OS command injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Zyxel Networks WAH7601 allows OS Command Injection.<br /> <br /> This issue affects WAH7601: through 20072026.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability in Zyxel Networks WAH7601 allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.<br /> <br /> This issue affects WAH7601: through 20072026.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage<br /> <br /> Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to<br /> the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out<br /> that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered,<br /> which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to<br /> be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress.<br /> <br /> Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in<br /> timekeeping_init().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing<br /> <br /> [There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream<br /> commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")]<br /> <br /> As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file<br /> cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware<br /> of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are<br /> opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that<br /> particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could&amp;#39;ve been<br /> dirtied.<br /> <br /> However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to<br /> coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios<br /> (from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen:<br /> <br /> open(file, O_RDWR)<br /> write(file)<br /> close(file)<br /> madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range)<br /> open(file, O_RDWR)<br /> nr_thps &gt; 0<br /> truncate_inode_pages()<br /> /* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */<br /> <br /> When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are<br /> fully discarded.<br /> <br /> Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing<br /> file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be<br /> observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the<br /> invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that<br /> do_dentry_open()&amp;#39;s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait.<br /> <br /> As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages<br /> lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the<br /> producer consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier:<br /> smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in<br /> get_write_access() -&gt; atomic_inc_unless_negative().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled<br /> <br /> HCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks<br /> queueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the<br /> work in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is<br /> reopened later if write_work was pending.<br /> <br /> Fix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work.<br /> <br /> Also make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync +<br /> enable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges<br /> the proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there,<br /> instead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly<br /> requeue the work after queue flush.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> HID: wacom: use GFP_ATOMIC in wacom_wac_queue_flush()<br /> <br /> wacom_wac_queue_flush() is called via the .raw_event callback<br /> (wacom_raw_event → wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce → wacom_wac_queue_flush).<br /> For USB HID devices, this callback is invoked from hid_irq_in(), which<br /> is a URB completion handler running in atomic context. Using GFP_KERNEL<br /> in this path can sleep, leading to a "scheduling while atomic" bug.<br /> <br /> Use GFP_ATOMIC instead. The existing code already handles allocation<br /> failure by skipping the fifo entry and continuing.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check to response query<br /> <br /> Add variable representations for BufLength and BufOffset in<br /> rndis_query_response(), and perform a length check on them.<br /> <br /> This is identical to how rndis_set_response() handles these parameters.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iio: core: fix uninitialized data in debugfs<br /> <br /> If *ppos is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize<br /> the start of buf[]. Non zero values for *ppos aren&amp;#39;t going to work<br /> anyway. Test for them at the start of the function and return -EINVAL.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable<br /> <br /> syzbot reported a puzzling splat:<br /> <br /> WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20<br /> <br /> stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in<br /> hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when<br /> debug_object_assert_init() can&amp;#39;t find a shadow object. In that case debug<br /> objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.<br /> <br /> Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the<br /> following a few seconds before the splat:<br /> <br /> ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled<br /> <br /> So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup<br /> failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug<br /> objects and freed the shadow objects:<br /> <br /> debug_object_assert_init()<br /> if (!debug_objects_enabled)<br /> return; obj = alloc();<br /> if (!obj) {<br /> // Out of memory<br /> debug_objects_enabled = false;<br /> free_objects();<br /> obj = lookup_or_alloc();<br /> <br /> // The lookup failed because the other side<br /> // removed the objects, so this returns<br /> // an error code as the object in question<br /> // is not statically initialized<br /> <br /> if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))<br /> return;<br /> if (!obj) {<br /> debug_oom();<br /> return;<br /> }<br /> <br /> print(...)<br /> if (!debug_objects_enabled)<br /> return;<br /> <br /> fixup(...)<br /> <br /> The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,<br /> but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer<br /> disfunctional.<br /> <br /> This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and<br /> debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized<br /> objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case<br /> gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the<br /> NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow<br /> object.<br /> <br /> Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before<br /> invoking the print and fixup function in those two places.