Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.<br /> <br /> new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature&amp;#39;s Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker&amp;#39;s NameID and attributes.<br /> <br /> Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature.<br /> <br /> _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath-&gt;exists(&amp;#39;dsig:Signature&amp;#39;, $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP&amp;#39;s encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.<br /> <br /> Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured.<br /> <br /> verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors &amp;&amp; !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response&amp;#39;s own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;".<br /> <br /> Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion-&gt;new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** HCL iControl is affected by Missing Access Control vulnerability. The application failed to enforce proper granular access controls, allowing users to access or view administrator-level functionalities without appropriate authorization.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** HCL iControl is affected by Weak SSL/TLS Version Supported vulnerability. It was observed that the application was using weak TLS versions such as TLS 1.0 and 1.1. These outdated protocols lack modern security features, making them vulnerable to known attacks and exposing sensitive information during data transmission.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key vulnerability in Menulux Software Inc. Mobile App allows Software Integrity Attack.<br /> <br /> This issue affects Mobile App: through 12.05.2026.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** An authentication bypass vulnerability in Check Point Security Management Server and Multi-Domain Security Management Server (MDS) could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to Management services to execute arbitrary commands on the Security Management Server. Successful exploitation could result in full compromise of the Security Management system. Check Point discovered this issue internally and has no indication of active exploitation.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A flaw has been found in GL.iNet GL-MT3000 up to 4.4.5. The impacted element is the function logread.set_config of the file /usr/lib/oui-httpd/rpc/logread of the component Logread Lua RPC Plugin. This manipulation of the argument record_size causes command injection. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and confirmed the existence of the vulnerability.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A vulnerability was detected in GL.iNet GL-MT3000 up to 4.4.5. The affected element is the function logread.get_system_log of the file /usr/lib/oui-httpd/rpc/logread of the component Logread Lua RPC plugin. The manipulation of the argument module results in command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and confirmed the existence of the vulnerability.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** CTI-Transmute is affected by a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the evaluation report PDF-generation functionality.<br /> <br /> User-controlled CTI content, including conversion names, descriptions, and comments, is converted from Markdown to HTML and rendered as a PDF using WeasyPrint. Before the patch, the renderer used WeasyPrint’s default URL-fetching behavior without restricting the protocols or destinations that could be referenced by the generated HTML.<br /> <br /> An attacker able to supply content included in an evaluation report could inject crafted resource references using schemes such as http://, https://, or file://. When the report was rendered, CTI-Transmute could fetch these resources using the application server’s network connectivity and filesystem privileges.<br /> <br /> Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to:<br /> <br /> * access services available only from the CTI-Transmute server or its internal network;<br /> * probe internal hosts and service endpoints;<br /> * retrieve local files readable by the application process; and<br /> * expose fetched content through the generated PDF, depending on the referenced resource type and rendering context.<br /> <br /> <br /> The vulnerability is corrected by providing WeasyPrint with a restrictive URL fetcher that permits only self-contained data: URIs. The externally hosted Google Fonts stylesheet was also removed so that PDF generation performs no intentional network or filesystem fetches.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** CTI-Transmute contains an uncontrolled resource-consumption vulnerability in the unauthenticated /activity_timeline endpoint. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled days query parameter that was not restricted to a reasonable range.<br /> <br /> A remote, unauthenticated attacker could submit an excessively large value for this parameter, causing the application to retrieve and process activity data over an arbitrarily large period. This could consume excessive database, CPU, or memory resources, delay the processing of concurrent requests, or trigger an internal server error. Repeated requests could further degrade the availability of the CTI-Transmute website.<br /> <br /> The vulnerability is corrected by clamping the requested timeline range to a minimum of one day and a maximum of 1,095 days.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** CTI-Transmute contained a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the administrative user deletion functionality. The /account/delete/ endpoint accepted HTTP GET requests for an operation that modified application state.<br /> <br /> An unauthenticated remote attacker could construct a malicious link or embed a request targeting this endpoint and induce an authenticated CTI-Transmute administrator to visit the attacker-controlled content. If the administrator had an active session, the browser would automatically include the administrator’s session credentials, causing the selected user account to be deleted without the administrator intentionally confirming the operation.<br /> <br /> Successful exploitation requires interaction from a currently authenticated administrator who has permission to delete users. The attacker does not need a CTI-Transmute account or administrative privileges because the forged request executes using the victim administrator’s session.<br /> <br /> The vulnerability could allow an attacker to delete arbitrary user accounts, resulting in unauthorized modification of application state and denial of access for affected users. Depending on whether administrators can delete other administrators or the final administrative account, exploitation could also disrupt administration of the CTI-Transmute instance.<br /> <br /> The patch resolves the issue by restricting the deletion endpoint to HTTP POST requests and submitting the deletion through a form containing a CSRF token.