Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> autofs: fix memory leak of waitqueues in autofs_catatonic_mode<br /> <br /> Syzkaller reports a memory leak:<br /> <br /> BUG: memory leak<br /> unreferenced object 0xffff88810b279e00 (size 96):<br /> comm "syz-executor399", pid 3631, jiffies 4294964921 (age 23.870s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff ..........&amp;#39;.....<br /> 08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..&amp;#39;.............<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x20/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1046<br /> [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:576 [inline]<br /> [] autofs_wait+0x3fa/0x9a0 fs/autofs/waitq.c:378<br /> [] autofs_do_expire_multi+0xa7/0x3e0 fs/autofs/expire.c:593<br /> [] autofs_expire_multi+0x53/0x80 fs/autofs/expire.c:619<br /> [] autofs_root_ioctl_unlocked+0x322/0x3b0 fs/autofs/root.c:897<br /> [] autofs_root_ioctl+0x25/0x30 fs/autofs/root.c:910<br /> [] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]<br /> [] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]<br /> [] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]<br /> [] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856<br /> [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> <br /> autofs_wait_queue structs should be freed if their wait_ctr becomes zero.<br /> Otherwise they will be lost.<br /> <br /> In this case an AUTOFS_IOC_EXPIRE_MULTI ioctl is done, then a new<br /> waitqueue struct is allocated in autofs_wait(), its initial wait_ctr<br /> equals 2. After that wait_event_killable() is interrupted (it returns<br /> -ERESTARTSYS), so that &amp;#39;wq-&gt;name.name == NULL&amp;#39; condition may be not<br /> satisfied. Actually, this condition can be satisfied when<br /> autofs_wait_release() or autofs_catatonic_mode() is called and, what is<br /> also important, wait_ctr is decremented in those places. Upon the exit of<br /> autofs_wait(), wait_ctr is decremented to 1. Then the unmounting process<br /> begins: kill_sb calls autofs_catatonic_mode(), which should have freed the<br /> waitqueues, but it only decrements its usage counter to zero which is not<br /> a correct behaviour.<br /> <br /> edit:imk<br /> This description is of course not correct. The umount performed as a result<br /> of an expire is a umount of a mount that has been automounted, it&amp;#39;s not the<br /> autofs mount itself. They happen independently, usually after everything<br /> mounted within the autofs file system has been expired away. If everything<br /> hasn&amp;#39;t been expired away the automount daemon can still exit leaving mounts<br /> in place. But expires done in both cases will result in a notification that<br /> calls autofs_wait_release() with a result status. The problem case is the<br /> summary execution of of the automount daemon. In this case any waiting<br /> processes won&amp;#39;t be woken up until either they are terminated or the mount<br /> is umounted.<br /> end edit: imk<br /> <br /> So in catatonic mode we should free waitqueues which counter becomes zero.<br /> <br /> edit: imk<br /> Initially I was concerned that the calling of autofs_wait_release() and<br /> autofs_catatonic_mode() was not mutually exclusive but that can&amp;#39;t be the<br /> case (obviously) because the queue entry (or entries) is removed from the<br /> list when either of these two functions are called. Consequently the wait<br /> entry will be freed by only one of these functions or by the woken process<br /> in autofs_wait() depending on the order of the calls.<br /> end edit: imk

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> maple_tree: fix potential out-of-bounds access in mas_wr_end_piv()<br /> <br /> Check the write offset end bounds before using it as the offset into the<br /> pivot array. This avoids a possible out-of-bounds access on the pivot<br /> array if the write extends to the last slot in the node, in which case the<br /> node maximum should be used as the end pivot.<br /> <br /> akpm: this doesn&amp;#39;t affect any current callers, but new users of mapletree<br /> may encounter this problem if backported into earlier kernels, so let&amp;#39;s<br /> fix it in -stable kernels in case of this.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> serial: sprd: Fix DMA buffer leak issue<br /> <br /> Release DMA buffer when _probe() returns failure to avoid memory leak.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> vfio/type1: fix cap_migration information leak<br /> <br /> Fix an information leak where an uninitialized hole in struct<br /> vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration on the stack is exposed to userspace.<br /> <br /> The definition of struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration contains a hole as<br /> shown in this pahole(1) output:<br /> <br /> struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration {<br /> struct vfio_info_cap_header header; /* 0 8 */<br /> __u32 flags; /* 8 4 */<br /> <br /> /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */<br /> <br /> __u64 pgsize_bitmap; /* 16 8 */<br /> __u64 max_dirty_bitmap_size; /* 24 8 */<br /> <br /> /* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 4 */<br /> /* sum members: 28, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */<br /> /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */<br /> };<br /> <br /> The cap_mig variable is filled in without initializing the hole:<br /> <br /> static int vfio_iommu_migration_build_caps(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,<br /> struct vfio_info_cap *caps)<br /> {<br /> struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration cap_mig;<br /> <br /> cap_mig.header.id = VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1_INFO_CAP_MIGRATION;<br /> cap_mig.header.version = 1;<br /> <br /> cap_mig.flags = 0;<br /> /* support minimum pgsize */<br /> cap_mig.pgsize_bitmap = (size_t)1 id, cap-&gt;version);<br /> if (IS_ERR(header))<br /> return PTR_ERR(header);<br /> <br /> memcpy(header + 1, cap + 1, size - sizeof(*header));<br /> <br /> return 0;<br /> }<br /> <br /> This issue was found by code inspection.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/msm: fix NULL-deref on irq uninstall<br /> <br /> In case of early initialisation errors and on platforms that do not use<br /> the DPU controller, the deinitilisation code can be called with the kms<br /> pointer set to NULL.<br /> <br /> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/525104/

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tracing/user_events: Ensure write index cannot be negative<br /> <br /> The write index indicates which event the data is for and accesses a<br /> per-file array. The index is passed by user processes during write()<br /> calls as the first 4 bytes. Ensure that it cannot be negative by<br /> returning -EINVAL to prevent out of bounds accesses.<br /> <br /> Update ftrace self-test to ensure this occurs properly.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> nilfs2: fix WARNING in mark_buffer_dirty due to discarded buffer reuse<br /> <br /> A syzbot stress test using a corrupted disk image reported that<br /> mark_buffer_dirty() called from __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() or<br /> nilfs_palloc_commit_alloc_entry() may output a kernel warning, and can<br /> panic if the kernel is booted with panic_on_warn.<br /> <br /> This is because nilfs2 keeps buffer pointers in local structures for some<br /> metadata and reuses them, but such buffers may be forcibly discarded by<br /> nilfs_clear_dirty_page() in some critical situations.<br /> <br /> This issue is reported to appear after commit 28a65b49eb53 ("nilfs2: do<br /> not write dirty data after degenerating to read-only"), but the issue has<br /> potentially existed before.<br /> <br /> Fix this issue by checking the uptodate flag when attempting to reuse an<br /> internally held buffer, and reloading the metadata instead of reusing the<br /> buffer if the flag was lost.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> btrfs: fix incorrect splitting in btrfs_drop_extent_map_range<br /> <br /> In production we were seeing a variety of WARN_ON()&amp;#39;s in the extent_map<br /> code, specifically in btrfs_drop_extent_map_range() when we have to call<br /> add_extent_mapping() for our second split.<br /> <br /> Consider the following extent map layout<br /> <br /> PINNED<br /> [0 16K) [32K, 48K)<br /> <br /> and then we call btrfs_drop_extent_map_range for [0, 36K), with<br /> skip_pinned == true. The initial loop will have<br /> <br /> start = 0<br /> end = 36K<br /> len = 36K<br /> <br /> we will find the [0, 16k) extent, but since we are pinned we will skip<br /> it, which has this code<br /> <br /> start = em_end;<br /> if (end != (u64)-1)<br /> len = start + len - em_end;<br /> <br /> em_end here is 16K, so now the values are<br /> <br /> start = 16K<br /> len = 16K + 36K - 16K = 36K<br /> <br /> len should instead be 20K. This is a problem when we find the next<br /> extent at [32K, 48K), we need to split this extent to leave [36K, 48k),<br /> however the code for the split looks like this<br /> <br /> split-&gt;start = start + len;<br /> split-&gt;len = em_end - (start + len);<br /> <br /> In this case we have<br /> <br /> em_end = 48K<br /> split-&gt;start = 16K + 36K // this should be 16K + 20K<br /> split-&gt;len = 48K - (16K + 36K) // this overflows as 16K + 36K is 52K<br /> <br /> and now we have an invalid extent_map in the tree that potentially<br /> overlaps other entries in the extent map. Even in the non-overlapping<br /> case we will have split-&gt;start set improperly, which will cause problems<br /> with any block related calculations.<br /> <br /> We don&amp;#39;t actually need len in this loop, we can simply use end as our<br /> end point, and only adjust start up when we find a pinned extent we need<br /> to skip.<br /> <br /> Adjust the logic to do this, which keeps us from inserting an invalid<br /> extent map.<br /> <br /> We only skip_pinned in the relocation case, so this is relatively rare,<br /> except in the case where you are running relocation a lot, which can<br /> happen with auto relocation on.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/msm/dpu: Add check for cstate<br /> <br /> As kzalloc may fail and return NULL pointer,<br /> it should be better to check cstate<br /> in order to avoid the NULL pointer dereference<br /> in __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset.<br /> <br /> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/514163/

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> md/raid10: fix memleak for &amp;#39;conf-&gt;bio_split&amp;#39;<br /> <br /> In the error path of raid10_run(), &amp;#39;conf&amp;#39; need be freed, however,<br /> &amp;#39;conf-&gt;bio_split&amp;#39; is missed and memory will be leaked.<br /> <br /> Since there are 3 places to free &amp;#39;conf&amp;#39;, factor out a helper to fix the<br /> problem.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> f2fs: fix to drop all dirty pages during umount() if cp_error is set<br /> <br /> xfstest generic/361 reports a bug as below:<br /> <br /> f2fs_bug_on(sbi, sbi-&gt;fsync_node_num);<br /> <br /> kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/super.c:1627!<br /> RIP: 0010:f2fs_put_super+0x3a8/0x3b0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> generic_shutdown_super+0x8c/0x1b0<br /> kill_block_super+0x2b/0x60<br /> kill_f2fs_super+0x87/0x110<br /> deactivate_locked_super+0x39/0x80<br /> deactivate_super+0x46/0x50<br /> cleanup_mnt+0x109/0x170<br /> __cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20<br /> task_work_run+0x65/0xa0<br /> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x175/0x190<br /> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x50<br /> do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc<br /> <br /> During umount(), if cp_error is set, f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() should<br /> not stop waiting all F2FS_WB_CP_DATA pages to be writebacked, otherwise,<br /> fsync_node_num can be non-zero after f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() causing<br /> this bug.<br /> <br /> In this case, to avoid deadloop in f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(), it needs<br /> to drop all dirty pages rather than redirtying them.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> fs/ntfs3: Return error for inconsistent extended attributes<br /> <br /> ntfs_read_ea is called when we want to read extended attributes. There<br /> are some sanity checks for the validity of the EAs. However, it fails to<br /> return a proper error code for the inconsistent attributes, which might<br /> lead to unpredicted memory accesses after return.<br /> <br /> [ 138.916927] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0<br /> [ 138.923876] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800205cfac by task poc/199<br /> [ 138.931132]<br /> [ 138.933016] CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1+ #4<br /> [ 138.938070] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014<br /> [ 138.947327] Call Trace:<br /> [ 138.949557] <br /> [ 138.951539] dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x67<br /> [ 138.956834] print_report+0x16f/0x4a6<br /> [ 138.960798] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0<br /> [ 138.964437] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200<br /> [ 138.969793] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0<br /> [ 138.973523] kasan_report+0xb8/0x140<br /> [ 138.976740] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0<br /> [ 138.980578] __asan_store4+0x76/0xa0<br /> [ 138.984669] ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0<br /> [ 138.988115] ? __pfx_ntfs_set_ea+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 138.993390] ? kernel_text_address+0xd3/0xe0<br /> [ 138.998270] ? __kernel_text_address+0x16/0x50<br /> [ 139.002121] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3e/0x60<br /> [ 139.005659] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.010177] ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0x100<br /> [ 139.013657] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x27/0x80<br /> [ 139.017018] ntfs_setxattr+0x405/0x440<br /> [ 139.022151] ? __pfx_ntfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.026569] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120<br /> [ 139.030329] ? kasan_save_stack+0x41/0x60<br /> [ 139.033883] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x60<br /> [ 139.037338] ? kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40<br /> [ 139.040163] ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30<br /> [ 139.043588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0xa0<br /> [ 139.047255] ? __kmalloc_node+0x68/0x150<br /> [ 139.051264] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120<br /> [ 139.055301] ? vmemdup_user+0x2b/0xa0<br /> [ 139.058584] __vfs_setxattr+0x121/0x170<br /> [ 139.062617] ? __pfx___vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.066282] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x97/0x300<br /> [ 139.070061] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x145/0x170<br /> [ 139.073580] vfs_setxattr+0x137/0x2a0<br /> [ 139.076641] ? __pfx_vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.080223] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20<br /> [ 139.084234] do_setxattr+0xce/0x150<br /> [ 139.087768] setxattr+0x126/0x140<br /> [ 139.091250] ? __pfx_setxattr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.094948] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xcb/0x140<br /> [ 139.097838] ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c7/0x330<br /> [ 139.102688] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30<br /> [ 139.105985] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x5b/0x190<br /> [ 139.109980] ? putname+0x84/0xa0<br /> [ 139.113886] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11e/0x1b0<br /> [ 139.117961] ? putname+0x84/0xa0<br /> [ 139.121316] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0<br /> [ 139.124427] ? __mnt_want_write+0xae/0x100<br /> [ 139.127836] ? mnt_want_write+0x8f/0x150<br /> [ 139.130954] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180<br /> [ 139.133998] ? __pfx_path_setxattr+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.137853] ? __pfx_ksys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 139.141299] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30<br /> [ 139.145714] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x6b/0x80<br /> [ 139.150796] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x71/0x90<br /> [ 139.155407] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90<br /> [ 139.159035] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc<br /> [ 139.163843] RIP: 0033:0x7f108cae4469<br /> [ 139.166481] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088<br /> [ 139.183764] RSP: 002b:00007fff87588388 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc<br /> [ 139.190657] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f108cae4469<br /> [ 139.196586] RDX: 00007fff875883b0 RSI: 00007fff875883d1 RDI: 00007fff875883b6<br /> [ 139.201716] RBP: 00007fff8758c530 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff8758c618<br /> [ 139.207940] R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000004004c0<br /> [ 139.214007] R13: 00007fff8758c610 R14: 0000000000000000 R15<br /> ---truncated---